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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The standard PSA method (based on fault tree link-
ing) is not well suited for the reliability assessment of 
the spent fuel pool of a nuclear power plant, for sev-
eral reasons. Firstly, the dynamics of the phenomena 
to be modeled are relatively slow because of the large 
amount of water available in the pool itself and in the 
safety systems. It is thus not sufficient to look at what 
can happen in only 24 hours after an initiator. Sec-
ondly, the fact that components are repairable, and the 
existence of multiple standby redundancies cannot be 
ignored. 
EDF has developed several tools for creating and 
quantifying dynamic models, better suited for this 
kind of system study. In particular, BDMPs (Boolean 
logic Driven Markov Processes) are a powerful mod-
eling tool for the dependability analysis of dynamic 
systems (Bouissou & Bon 2003). For more than ten 
years, they have been used for assessing the reliabil-
ity, availability, and safety of complex reconfigurable 
systems. BDMPs have a graphical representation 
close to fault trees, yet they specify (potentially very 
large) CTMCs (continuous time Markov chains). A 
BDMP model with the same detail level as fault trees 
of a standard PSA would not be quantifiable by ana-
lytical methods, even with classical approximations. 
On the other hand, it would require too large compu-
tation times with Monte Carlo simulation, because the 
probability of reaching a too low level in the spent 
fuel pool is very small.      
For these reasons, we have developed a new approxi-
mate method for the quantification of very large 
BDMPs, and more generally any model able to gen-
erate minimal products containing one initiating 
event and the failures of the barriers activated after it 
in order to avoid the undesirable event. This is why 
the main foreseen application domain is nuclear PSA, 
all the more so as existing PSA models will be very 
easy to adapt to I&AB, merely by adding repair rates 
to component data. In a PSA context, I&AB can be 
used to take repairs into account instead of postulat-
ing that 24 hours after an initiating event, either the 
undesirable event is unavoidable, or the system is in 
a safe state. The I&AB (Initiator and all barriers) main 
principles were published in a paper at ESREL 2016 
(Bouissou & Hernu 2016). In the present paper, we 
give all analytical formulae of I&AB and of its exten-
sion in the case of grace times and deterministic fail-
ures. We also give some numerical application exam-
ples, comparing the I&AB approximation to “exact” 
calculations performed on a dynamic model via 
Monte Carlo simulation.  
2 THE INITIAL I&AB METHOD (2016) 
2.1 Hypothesis on the system and definitions 
Suppose we want to calculate the reliability of a re-
pairable system with standby redundancies; it may be 
a good approximation to take into account only one 
level of dependences between the components. In 
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other words, one is capable to distinguish failures of 
“normal” components (they are called "initiating 
events") and failures of components in standby (that 
function only in case of failures of normal compo-
nents). But one cannot discriminate between a com-
ponent of “primary standby” (that assures the func-
tioning of the system after a failure of the 
corresponding normal component) and a component 
of “secondary standby” (that operates only after a 
failure of the primary standby component). 
The I&AB method relies on the two following ap-
proximations: 
A0: When an initiating event occurs, all standby 
components are supposed to start functioning (or 
maybe refuse to start) immediately after the initiating 
event; then, they may fail and be repaired inde-
pendently from each other until the initiating event is 
repaired. 
A1: Once an initiating event is repaired, the system 
cannot anymore fail, whatever happens. 
 
We suppose that the real system is described by a 
CTMC where the initial, "perfect" state is the state 
into which the system always returns, until it is ab-
sorbed by a failure state. Then its unreliability can be 
estimated from the following formula (Bouissou & 
Bon 1992):   ≤ 1 −  exp−Λ (1) 
where Λ is the frequency of initiating events (sum 
of rates of all transitions exiting the initial state) and 
p is the probability that the initiating events lead to an 
accident before the system goes back to the perfect 
state. 
In I&AB, in order to estimate p we use the "mini-
mal content of (failure) sequences" (MCS) of the 
Markov chain, as it was defined in (Bouissou 2006). 
The formal definition of a MCS is given ibid, but it 
can be defined informally as the result of a Boolean 
reduction of the following fault tree: a single OR gate 
with one son per failure sequence, each son being pre-
sented as an AND gate over the events appearing in 
the sequence. Initiating events must be distinguished 
from other events, so that for example, the MCS of a 
system made of 2 components Y and Z in active re-
dundancy is {Y_init, Z} {Z_init, Y} and not simply 
{Y, Z}. 
For real, complex systems, the MCS can be ob-
tained in (at least) two ways: by building a PSA type 
model made of event trees and fault trees, and calcu-
lating its minimal cut sets, or by building a BDMP 
and applying the steps described in (Bouissou & 
Hernu 2016) to transform it into a standard fault tree 
whose minimal cut sets are the MCS of the Markov 
chain specified by the BDMP. In the remainder of the 
paper, we will therefore suppose that we have the 
MCS of the studied system at hand, and we will call 
its elements "minimal products". 
2.2 I&AB general formulae 
Let us suppose that there are n initiating events that 
can lead out the system from its perfect state. Then, 
according to (1), the system unreliability at time t can 
be found from  ≤ 1 −  exp−  ∑ λ  (2) 
where λie is the failure rate of initiating event ie and 
pie includes probabilities for all k minimal products 
corresponding to it. 
In calculations we distinguish two time intervals. 
The first interval is the mission time figuring in (2). 
The second time interval is infinite and starts once an 
initiating event takes place. The probability that all 
components in a minimal product c fail within time 
interval [0, ∞[ is simply the unreliability of a parallel 
system made of these components ∞; then we 
can use the following upper bound for pie, that will be 
a good approximation when all failure probabilities 
are small:  ≤ ∑ ∞  (3) 
Using the Murchland approximation, we obtain:  ≤ ∑ E∞  (4) 
 where ∞is the number of failures of the mini-
mal product c on an infinite horizon. What keeps pie 
small is the fact that in the initial state considered for 
c, the initiating event is realized with probability 1, 
but once repaired, it never fails again, contrary to 
other elements of the product. (this is the approxima-
tion A1). 
In order to calculate E  we need to give first 
a few definitions. We will utilize the following relia-
bility characteristics: 
− Unavailability Q(t) – the probability that a compo-
nent is in a failure state at time t; 
− Unconditional failure intensity W(t): W(t)Δt is the 
mean number of failures of a component between 
t and t + ∆t. 
For markovian basic events, depending on their type, 
these quantities are given by the following expres-
sions: 
− Initiating event (the repair is definitive)   = exp−μ # = 0  
− Failure in operation (it can fail several times)  
  = λλ + μ [1 − exp−λ + μ% # = λ1 −   
 
− Failure on demand (the repair is definitive)   = γexp−μ # = 0 
Because of the lack of space, we will not recall here 
the demonstration given in (Bouissou & Hernu 2016) 
that leads to the following formula, written for a min-
imal product c containing l failures on demand and m 
failures in function. E = ∏ γ,( × * exp−μ,+,+-+./  (5) 
with ,+ = exp−+ ∑ μ,0(0  ∑ #,+ ∏  ,0+10021 . 
Equation (5) assumes that a minimal product con-
tains at least one basic event with a failure in opera-
tion. However, sometimes minimal products are only 
composed of basic events corresponding to failures 
on demand (plus one initiating event, as usually). In 
such a case, we suppose that these events happen at t 
= 0 and the unreliability for minimal product c is 
given by: ∞ = Prtop = true at  = 0 = ∏ γ,( . (6) 
2.3 I&AB formulae in the markovian case 
The general equation (5) yields a closed form formula 
in the purely markovian case, where all components 
have constant failure and repair rates. 
In order to simplify notations, we will omit the in-
dex c in the remainder of this section: we will implic-
itly give formulas for a single minimal product.  
Taking an infinite time horizon and replacing #+ by its expression given in section 2.2 for a failure 
in operation, equation (5) becomes: 9∞ = ∏ γ( × * exp−μ+,+-+:/  (7) 
with ,+ = exp−+ ∑ μ0(0  ∑ λ;1 −1                ;+ ∏  0+ =1002exp −+ ∑ μ0(0  ∑ λ; <∏  0+ − ∏  0+101002 =1 . 
Here we need to introduce new notations in order to 
simplify upcoming formulas. Let: > = μ;? + ∑ μ@A@=1    B = λ; + μ;  
Hence, replacing the functions Qj by their definitions 
and using these new notations, we obtain: 9∞ = ∏ γ;A;=1  ∑ λ ×C;=1   
 D∏ EFGF  1002 * ?HIJ ∏ 1 − ?HGFJ1002 -+:/ −∏ EFGF  10 * ?HIJ ∏ 1 − ?HGFJ10 -+:/ K.        (8) 
Each integrand includes a product of functions, which 
can be represented in the following way: 
∏ 1 − ?HGFJ10 =  = 1 − ∑ ?HGMJ1 + ∑ ?HGMJ ∑ ?HGFJ10N1 −∑ ?HGMJ ∑ ?HGFJ10N ∑ ?HGOJ1N01 + ⋯ +−11exp− ∑ B+1 .  (9) 
Hence, after the integration from 0 to infinity, we 
obtain an alternating series, every term of which, in 
its turn, is a sum of fractions. For instance, the second 
integral results in: 
* ?HIJ ∏ 1 − ?HGFJ10 -+:/ = I − ∑ IQGM1 +∑ ∑ IQGMQGF10N1 − ∑ ∑ ∑ IQGMQGFQGO1N010N1 + ⋯  … + −11μ + ∑ B1 H .  (10) 
The first integral is calculated in a similar way, the 
only difference is that one should exclude current el-
ement ; from the product. 
These analytical formulae (8) and (10) seem very 
cumbersome; however, they permit to considerably 
reduce the processing time (in comparison with a nu-
merical integration) while ensuring an excellent accu-
racy. 
3 I&AB EXTENSIONS 
3.1 Taking grace times into account 
In this section, the focus is on systems such that, after 
the loss of all components subject to random failures 
in a minimal product, the undesirable event is delayed 
by some physical process that guarantees a determin-
istic grace time. The spent fuel pool is a good exam-
ple: after the complete loss of the cooling system, the 
water will heat until it boils, but this process is deter-
ministic and it would give an excessively conserva-
tive evaluation to replace the grace time by a random 
delay, exponentially distributed in order to stay in the 
markovian framework.  
We first suppose that we need to quantify minimal 
products containing failures of components (with the 
same hypotheses as in § 2.3) and a single determinis-
tic grace time. Let Xc be the failure time of the set Ac 
of markovian elements of the minimal product c, Yc 
the time needed to repair at least one of the markovian 
components, starting from the state where they are all 
failed, and Tc the grace time. For sake of simplicity, 
we suppose that after a given occurrence of the initi-
ator, the basic event corresponding to the grace time 
behaves like a Heaviside function: it becomes true at 
Xc +Tc and stays true forever (it is “not repairable”).  
The probability pie to go from the state where the sys-
tem is just after the initiator ie to the failure state can 
be estimated as:   ≈ ∑ 9∞ ∙ PrU > W .      (11) 
The total repair rate when all markovian components 
are failed is the sum of their repair rates. Hence PrU > W = exp−W ∑ μ∈YZ .  (12) 
As for 9∞, it can be computed using the for-
mulae of §2.3.  
To conclude this section, let us mention that the 
grace delay may depend on the minimal product, and 
that a minimal product can contain two or more grace 
delays: in this case, only the last one must be taken 
into account (cf. §4.1.2 for more details about this 
choice).  
3.2 Taking deterministic failures into account 
If, after a non-recovered loss of cooling, the water 
starts to boil in the fuel pool, there is a possibility to 
add water coming from tanks. However, the capacity 
of tanks is limited and after a given time the water 
flow is interrupted: this is what we call a deterministic 
failure. After a given initiator, such failures can be 
considered as non-repairable: it is impossible to re-
plenish the tanks in a short amount of time (the same 
applies to batteries). However, in a dynamic model, 
they can be associated to a repair (with a small repair 
rate, see discussion on that topic in §4.1.2) in order to 
allow the model to return to its initial state. In order 
to be consistent with general assumptions of I&AB, 
we will suppose that the "timers" associated to deter-
ministic failures start just after the initiating event; 
this is obviously conservative, as in fact they start af-
ter some failures. This assumption has an immediate 
consequence: if there are two or more deterministic 
failures in a minimal product, the one associated to 
the greatest delay suffices to prevent the minimal 
product from becoming true until it happens. So, 
without loss of generality, we will consider in this 
section that we want to quantify a minimal product 
containing l failures on demand, m failures in func-
tion, and one deterministic failure.  
We define the unavailability Q and unconditional 
failure intensity W, needed in equation (5), for this 
type of basic event. Q is a Heaviside function and W 
a Dirac distribution: 
  =  = H/ = \0,  < /1,  ≥ /  # = _ − /.  
With these notations, equation (5) can be written 
as follows (with an infinite time horizon, and omitting 
the minimal product index c): 9∞ = ∏ γ;A;=1 × * exp−μ+ − ∑ μ+(  ×:/∑ #+ ∏  0+1Q0021Q -+ (13)  
Taking, as in § 2.3, 
 > = μ;? + ∑ μ@A@=1  and B = λ; + μ; 
9∞ = ∏ γ;A;=1 ×
* exp−μ+ ∑ #+ `∏  0+1002 ×1:/
                H/a -+ + * exp−μ+_+ −:/
                /∏  0+10 -+   
Finally,  9∞ = ∏ γ;A;=1 ×* exp−μ+ ∑ #+ ∏  0+10021 -+:.b +exp−μ/ ∏  0/10   (14) 
The second term (the integral) of equation (13) can be 
written, using the same notations as in §2.3: 
∑ λ D∏ EFGF  1002 * ?HIJ ∏ 1 − ?HGFJ1002 -+:.b −1∏ EFGF  10 * ?HIJ ∏ 1 − ?HGFJ10 -+:.b K.  (15) 
After integration from t0 to infinity, we obtain for the 
second integral the following alternate sum: 
* ?HIJ ∏ 1 − ?HGFJ10 -+:.b = cdeHI.bI −   
∑ cde HIQGM.bIQGM1 + ∑ ∑ cdeHIQGMQGF.bIQGMQGF10N1 −∑ ∑ ∑ cdeHIQGMQGFQGO.bIQGM QGFQGO1N010N1 + ⋯  … + −11μ + ∑ B1 Hexp −μ + ∑ B1 /.  
 
Of course, taking t0 = 0, we obtain again the formula 
(10) given in §2.3. 
All these formulae are so complicated that it is nec-
essary to carefully validate their implementation in a 
program. The next section has two purposes: give 
what we believe is the result of I&AB (we cannot 
guarantee that our Python implementation is totally 
bug free) and see how I&AB approximations com-
pare to more precise calculations made by Monte 
Carlo simulation (the only possible method because 
of deterministic times) on a truly dynamic model.  
4 ACCURACY TESTS OF I&AB EXTENSIONS  
The small examples of this section were designed just 
to make comparisons between I&AB and "exact" cal-
culations performed with Monte Carlo simulation. In 
practice the models were input graphically as BDMPs 
in KB3 (see Figure 1 for an example), then processed 
both by I&AB and by the Monte Carlo simulator 
YAMS. An overview of EDF tools including KB3 
and YAMS is given in (Bouissou 2005). 
In all calculations, failures are associated to a failure 
rate of 10-3/h and repair rate of 2 10-2/h. The grace 
times and delays of deterministic failures are indi-
cated in § 4.1 and 4.2. Table 1 gives a synthesis of all 
comparisons. The numbers in the first column corre-
spond to the numbers of sections below that explain 
the test cases. All calculations with I&AB require a 
negligible time, whereas some of the Monte Carlo 
simulations require a few minutes for sufficient pre-
cision. 
   
Table 1.  I&AB accuracy on various simple test cases. Columns 
2 and 3 are the estimations of the unreliability at 10000 hours 
computed by I&AB and Monte Carlo simulation (the last col-
umn is the width half of the 90% confidence interval of the 
YAMS result). 
 
Test case        I&AB           YAMS  conf. interval 
4.1.1 a     5.25 10-3   5.05 10-3  5.21 10-5 
4.1.1 b     1.17 10-3   1.12 10-3  5.50 10-5 
4.1.1 c     5.85 10-5   5.72 10-5  3.93 10-6 
 
4.1.2 a     7.08 10-3   2.60 10-3  2.64 10-4 
4.1.2 b     1.73 10-2   3.90 10-3  3.24 10-4 
4.1.2 c     2.89 10-3   6.95 10-4  4.33 10-5 
4.1.2 d     9.55 10-3   1.03 10-3  5.27 10-5 
4.1.2 e     3.54 10-4   3.80 10-5  1.01 10-5 
4.1.2 f     3.89 10-3   1.00 10-4  1.64 10-5 
 
4.2.1 a     1.87 10-1   1.67 10-1  8.67 10-4 
4.2.1 b     6.21 10-3   5.44 10-3  1.71 10-4 
4.2.1 c     1.65 10-3   1.67 10-3  9.50 10-5 
 
4.2.2 a     1.87 10-1   1.42 10-2  2.75 10-4 
4.2.2 b     1.87 10-1   1.56 10-2  2.88 10-4 
4.2.2 c     6.21 10-3   9.86 10-4  7.30 10-5 
4.2.2 d     6.21 10-3   1.14 10-3  7.86 10-5 
4.2.2 e     1.65 10-3   8.28 10-4  4.73 10-5 
4.2.2 f     1.65 10-3   8.62 10-4  4.83 10-5 
 
Below are the descriptions of the test cases and com-
ments on the results.  
4.1 Grace times 
4.1.1 Single grace time 
The minimal product to quantify is {Initiator, A, B, 
grace_time}. In the dynamic model, there are only 
two sequences: Initiator, A, B, grace_time and Initia-
tor, B, A, grace_time (A and B are in active redun-
dancy). The grace time is successively taken equal to 
25h (line 4.1.1.a of Table 1), 50h (line b), 100h (line 
c).  
In this case, I&AB works quite well, and it is not 
surprising, given the fact that the dynamic model cor-
responds exactly to the simplifying assumptions 
made in § 2.1. 
4.1.2 Two grace times 
The minimal product to quantify is {Initiator, A, 
grace_time_1, B, grace_time_2}. In the dynamic 
model, there is only one sequence: Initiator, A, 
grace_time_1, B, grace_time_2. The grace time is 
fractioned, and the component B can fail only after 
the failure of A and the end of grace_time_1. The two 
grace times (in hours) are successively taken equal to 
(5, 20) (line 4.1.2a of Table 1), (20, 5) (line b), (15, 
35) (line c), (35, 15) (line d), (30, 70) (line e), (70, 30) 
(line f). Note that in the dynamic model, the basic 
event grace_time_1 is considered as repairable (with 
repair rate equal to 1/250h), so that after an initiating 
event, the system can return to its initial state pro-
vided it does not reach the undesirable event; the 
value chosen for the repair rate is not sensitive as long 
as the mean time to repair components is much 
smaller than the mean time to repair the grace time: 
in such a case, after a given occurrence of the initia-
tor, the grace time can be considered as "not repaira-
ble" just like in I&AB. In the simulation model, the 
order of the two grace times makes a difference if they 
are not equal. In I&AB, it is also the case because 
only the last grace delay is taken into account. We 
have also tested the idea of taking the sum of the two 
grace delays like a single one in I&AB: it yields re-
sults much closer to those of the dynamic model, but 
this approximation can produce optimistic results in 
some cases (for case f the result is 5.85 10-5). Intui-
tively, this is due to the fact that in the dynamic model 
only the last grace delay is competing with all repairs 
of the markovian elements of the cut set. Cf. also § 5.     
4.2 Deterministic failures 
4.2.1 Barriers in active redundancy 
Let us consider a little hydraulic system modeled by 
the BDMP below:  
Figure 1. BDMP modeling a system with bounded capacities 
 
When the initiator Leak occurs, the two barriers (each 
one composed of a pump and a tank) are activated. 
The undesirable event occurs if, before the repair of 
the leak, the two pumping systems are lost, either be-
cause of a random failure of the pump, or because the 
tank is empty. The failure and repair rates for random 
events are as described at the beginning of §4, except 
that the repair rate of the Leak is 0.1/h in order to get 
small enough probabilities.  
The results given in Table 1 correspond to the fol-
lowing values for the times after which Tank1 and 
Tank2 are empty: (40, 30) (line 4.2.1a), (80, 60) (line 
b), (150, 100) (line c). Note that the order of the two 
numbers is not important here, because of the sym-
metry of the two barriers. I&AB performs quite well 
on this example, where the minimal product contain-
ing the two deterministic failures is dominant. In the 
dynamic model as well as in I&AB, the amount of 
water in the biggest tank is the most influent parame-
ter.  
4.2.2 Barrier 2 activated on failure of barrier 1 
 
In this case, in the dynamic model, the functioning 
times of the two tanks add up, unless a failure of 
pump1 forces to start barrier2 before depletion of 
tank1. It is therefore not surprising that I&AB is more 
conservative in this case than when the two barriers 
are in active redundancy. The BDMP corresponding 
to this case is not shown, because it is the BDMP of 
Figure 1 with just one additional trigger (red dotted 
line), going from gate Barrier1_lost to gate Bar-
rier2_lost. There is no need to re-run the calculations 
with I&AB, since for this method, this case gives the 
same results as the previous one (active redundancy 
of barriers). But here, the capacities of the two tanks 
are not exchangeable in the dynamic model, this is 
why we ran YAMS with the following couples of val-
ues for deterministic delays: (40, 30) (line 4.2.2a), 
(30, 40) (line b), (80, 60) (line c), (60, 80) (line d), 
(150, 100) (line e), (100, 150) (line f). The unreliabil-
ity increases a bit when the greatest delay is the last 
one. Going from line a to f, the results of I&AB range 
from extremely conservative (by a factor 10) to ac-
ceptably conservative (by a factor 2). On the other 
hand, using the sum of the delays instead of the great-
est cannot be recommended because it could lead to 
optimistic results.  
5 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GRACE TIMES 
AND DETERMINISTIC DELAYS 
In a dynamic model like a BDMP, both grace times 
and deterministic delays are represented as leaves as-
sociated to a deterministic time to failure. So the dif-
ference between those two concepts is not obvious. In 
essence, the difference between a grace delay and a 
deterministic failure is that:  
- Once the grace delay has started, whatever happens 
on the system can only postpone (case of a repair) the 
undesirable event, or leave it unchanged (case of a 
failure); 
- In the case of a deterministic failure, whatever hap-
pens on the system can only make the undesirable 
event happen sooner (case of a failure), or leave it un-
changed (case of a repair). 
The I&AB theory makes a very clear distinction 
between the two concepts, because it considers that 
the grace time starts when all other components of the 
cut set have failed, whereas the timer of a determinis-
tic failure starts just after the initiator. An intermedi-
ate grace time such as in the example of § 4.1.2 cor-
responds to none of these cases, this is why in I&AB 
it should be simply ignored. It is the user's responsi-
bility to mark leaves as grace delays, deterministic 
failures or "to be ignored" in the BDMP before trans-
forming it into input data for I&AB. 
On a large model, it is probable that the few mini-
mal products with a too conservative quantification 
will be "hidden in the crowd" and that the global re-
sult will not be much affected.   
6 APPLICATION TO THE SPENT FUEL POOL 
To perform all our tests so far, we have used the im-
plementation of I&AB that we described in (Bouissou 
& Hernu 2016). It is not the most efficient because it 
separates the search for minimal products from their 
quantification, therefore preventing the use of a prob-
ability threshold to discard at an early stage in the cal-
culations most minimal products, as it is done by the 
MOCUS algorithm (Fussell & Vesely 1972). In spite 
of this limitation, we have been able to demonstrate 
impressive performances of I&AB in the spent fuel 
pool application. 
We have built a model relative to the spent fuel 
pool of the European Pressurized Reactor and its sup-
port systems. Although less detailed than a classical 
PSA model, the BDMP we have built takes into ac-
count all dependances due to standby redundancies, 
common cause failures, sharing of electrical sup-
plies… The model takes into account both the grace 
time of 14 hours before boiling of the water and de-
terministic failures of tanks used to replace evapo-
rated water.  
This BDMP (326 leaves, 77191 minimal products 
of order up to 6) could be processed by I&AB in a 
few minutes on a laptop. This model happened to be 
also quantifiable by YAMS: the Monte Carlo simula-
tion gave a failure probability smaller than the result 
of I&AB by a factor around 2, but the calculation took 
25 minutes to reach a 10% precision with 95% of con-
fidence on the same machine.  
Besides, with Monte Carlo simulation, it is very 
hard to get qualitative results: for that particular 
model, there is only one dominant sequence and all 
other sequences are much less probable: it would re-
quire many hours of simulation to get results compa-
rable to the, say, 10 most probable minimal products 
that are easily identified by the I&AB method. 
  
8 CONCLUSION 
I&AB is an analytical method for the reliability cal-
culation of large repairable systems with dependences 
between components. Two kinds of models can serve 
as input for this method: BDMPs or standard nuclear 
PSA models complying with the fault tree linking 
method. Both of them can be transformed into a set of 
minimal products that are the basis of the calculation. 
I&AB as it was described in (Bouissou & Hernu 
2016) cannot readily be used for the fuel pool case, 
because for this system, there are two kinds of deter-
ministic delays that must be taken into account: grace 
times, and deterministic failures due to the limited ca-
pacity of water tanks.  
In the present paper, we have given two theoretical 
contributions: the analytical formulae of the I&AB 
method (so far, they were only available in the French 
patent file FR3044787) and their extension in the case 
of deterministic delays. In addition, we have shown 
on several examples that the extended method can 
yield reasonably conservative results, in times incom-
parably shorter than Monte Carlo simulation.  
Thanks to a partnership between EDF and Lloyd's 
Register, I&AB will soon be available for the large 
community of users of the RiskSpectrum PSA tool. 
This could revolutionize PSA praxis in upcoming 
years.  
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